Abstract We survey tenure-track faculty members employed in three fields in colleges of agriculture at land-grant universities-agricultural economics, agronomy, and food science-to evaluate the effects of different employment structures and incentives on research productivity. These evaluations include conducting statistical tests to assess any effects of different academic appointments and developing a regression model to measure the effects of these and other attributes on individual research productivity, as defined by the number of publications in the Thomson ISI Web of Science. We find faculty who hold larger teaching and extension appointments produce fewer publications; we also find positive effects on the number of publications for grants and university funding, multi-institutional research collaboration, and number of graduate students advised.
Introduction
The ability to recruit and retain highly productive faculty has become an increasingly challenging task for university administrators in times of shrinking budgets and limitations on resources. A related challenge for administrators involves creating incentives to increase the productivity of current faculty members. These challenges may be more complex for administrators in colleges of agriculture at land-grant universities whose faculty must fulfill missions of teaching, research, and extension activities. The salaries of faculty with these multiple appointments are typically funded through separate entities, including agricultural experiment stations, cooperative extension services, and colleges of agriculture. The share of the salary funded by each entity typically corresponds to the share of work activities a faculty member is expected to devote to that entity's mission. For example, a faculty member in food science with an appointment of 25 % teaching and 75 % research will likely have his or her salary funded in these proportions by the university's college of agriculture and the state's agricultural experiment station, respectively, and is expected to allocate his or her work load between these units accordingly. 1 For many of these faculty members who hold a research appointment it represents the majority of their total appointment, and therefore assessing their productivity becomes largely an exercise in assessing their research productivity. Moreover, as is the case for faculty members in other colleges, promotion and tenure decisions often hinge significantly on an individual's research activities. As a result evaluating the research output of faculty in colleges of agriculture becomes similar to evaluating that of their counterparts in colleges of arts and sciences, business, education, and engineering. In one sense assessment and evaluation of faculty in colleges of agriculture who hold majority research appointments is an evaluation of traditional Mode I research as described by Gibbons et al. (1994) . However, because of the multiple appointments these faculty members hold-specifically extension appointments, many of which consist of substantial shares of time-a number of these faculty members also function as part of Gibbons et al.' s Mode 2 research. Thus, because they hold significant research and extension appointments, many faculty in colleges of agriculture are effectively required by design to diffuse knowledge in Mode 1 as well as Mode 2. However, because of the different responsibilities and funding arrangements for faculty in colleges of agriculture, administrators at land-grant universities may face additional constraints in recruiting and retaining these faculty members. Thus, assessing research productivity and determining the most effective structures to foster productivity among faculty in colleges of agriculture becomes even more critical for these administrators and is the focus of our study.
We survey tenure-track faculty members employed in three fields in colleges of agriculture at land-grant universities-agricultural economics, agronomy, and food scienceto evaluate the effects of different employment structures and incentives on research productivity. These evaluations include conducting statistical tests to assess any effects of different academic appointments and developing a regression model to measure the effects of these and other attributes on individual research productivity, as defined by the number of publications.
Evaluating research productivity literature review
As Amara and Landry (2012) as well as Porter and Toutkoushian (2006) note, research productivity among faculty members is frequently evaluated by using the information on publications contained in the Thomson ISI Web of Science (WoS). The WoS consists primarily of citations in peer-reviewed journals in the sciences, social sciences, arts, and humanities, and therefore represents de facto Mode 1 research. For example, Abramo and D'Angelo (2009 ), Gorraiz et al. (2009 ), and Toutkoushian et al. (2003 -as well as a number of other authors-all use the number of publications in the WoS as a measure of individual or institutional research output. Thus, we are comfortable using this measure to assess the research output of individual faculty members across the disciplines we select.
A smaller but significant body of research investigates the effects of different incentives on faculty research productivity. In a relatively early study, Fenker (1977) investigates an effective method of measuring an institution's incentive structure. While his concern is incentives to increase teaching productivity, his overarching focus is on the development of a methodology for incentive structures, which can also apply to research productivity. Interestingly, Fenker-citing previous research-concludes teaching and research are essentially independent activities for faculty so that incentives that improve one will have little effect on the other because of the lack of overlap. Nevertheless, as discussed in a later section, we incorporate some of these same incentives in our survey. Another relatively early article by Smart (1978) examines incentive structures by institution type according to the Carnegie classification system. He finds that faculty at Doctoral-Granting Universities II and Liberal Arts Colleges I indicate a ''strong, mutual preference for greater research incentives.'' He also finds that faculty at Doctoral-Granting Universities I and Comprehensive Universities and Colleges I and II lack strong preferences for any particular type of incentive (family, research, administrative advancement, interpersonal, academic recognition, or teaching). We also include some of Smart's incentives in our survey. Ponomariov and Boardman (2010) investigate the influence of university research centers on the productivity of faculty in terms of articles found in the WoS. Incorporating such centers into an analysis of factors affecting productivity is important, as they note, ''University research centers… have become the predominant policy response to scientific and technical demands that have not been met by extant institutions…'' Ponomariov and Boardman find from their analysis that faculty who are affiliated with these centers are in fact more productive, collaborate more with both industry and their colleagues, and engage in more interdisciplinary work.
In their survey of life sciences faculty, Blumenthal et al. (1996) find those who receive support from industry have rates of publication at least as high as those who do not and are more commercially productive (i.e., obtain more patents) than other faculty. However, they also find an apparent upper boundary for such support, as ''Respondents with more than two-thirds of their funding from industry had significantly lower rates of publication and less influential articles than respondents with less support from industry.'' Lee and Bozeman (2005) evaluate the effects of research collaboration on individual research productivity, as measured by the number of peer-reviewed journal articles in the WoS. They find that collaboration strongly predicts publishing productivity when measured by an individual's total number of publications-that is, articles that list an individual as author or co-author. However, when productivity is measured by dividing each article by the number of co-authors to generate a ''fractional count,'' they do not find a significant relationship with collaboration. Lee and Bozeman note that their ''normal count'' analysis indicates administrators who seek greater research collaboration from their faculty should not expect to observe declines in publishing productivity. On the other hand, they state their ''fractional analysis'' shows that administrators should ''have something more than a knee-jerk reaction to the presumed benefits of collaboration.'' Lee and Bozeman also point the need for further analysis of collaboration, particularly its composition.
In her survey of Chief Academic Officers (CAOs), O'Meara (2006) finds that those who reported their institution made changes to their reward system in the last decade to recognize multiple forms of scholarship employ faculty with greater overall job satisfaction than those institutions that did not implement reform. More importantly, O'Meara concludes that by signaling to faculty that multiple forms of scholarship will be valued, these institutions can affect the behavior and satisfaction of these faculty. Long et al. (2009) determine that in the field of information science faculty members who are affiliated with ''high status'' institutions publish a greater number of articles in top journals. The quality of these articles also appears to be significantly greater, as determined by citations of this research. Long et al.'s study also finds that graduates of high status doctoral programs do not produce more articles than those from other programs, although the former did produce articles with more citations. Thus, they find that in information science, academic affiliation is a significant determinant of research productivity while academic origin is not.
A number of articles by Fairweather examine the relationship between teaching and research activities. In Fairweather (1999) he finds that at 4-year institutions, ''the most common factor in simultaneously achieving high teaching and research productivity is to spend more hours in the classroom.'' However, he also notes in Fairweather (2002) that in practice very few faculty members accomplish this goal. Because he finds policies encouraging teaching or research productivity often do so to the detriment of the other, he suggests policies should distinguish across faculty responsibilities. Fairweather also concludes specific policies at institutions to increase teaching and research productivity, ''must simultaneously reinforce either teaching or research productivity.' ' Konrad and Pfeffer (1990) find a number of factors increase returns to productivity among faculty members; i.e., productivity has a greater impact on pay. These include several characteristics relating to the culture of departments, such as a strong emphasis on research and ''more research collaboration and more social contact among the faculty.'' Related, they also find greater returns to productivity under, ''departmental governance constrained by rules or frequent turnover of the administrator.'' Given our focus on faculty in colleges of agriculture at land-grant universities, the specialized literature in agriculture is also relevant. One significant study is by Foltz and Barham (2009) , who investigate the productivity of faculty members with extension appointments. A major finding of their study is that faculty with extension appointments generated a significantly smaller number of journal articles 2 over a 5-year period than faculty with no extension appointments. However, they also find relatively small differences in journal article output between faculty who hold extension appointments and those who do not when extension appointments do not exceed *40 %. Foltz and Barham also find that for faculty with relatively high extension appointments (greater than 60 %), the number of journal articles they produce falls sharply without a corresponding increase in extension outputs (bulletins and presentations).
In an article specific to faculty in departments of agricultural economics, Hilmer and Hilmer (2005) examine how the salaries of these faculty members are affected by the quality of the journal in which articles are published, if a journal article has one or more co-authors, and the order of these co-authors. They conclude articles published in top journals in agricultural economics and economics result in ''significant positive returns'' from departments of agricultural economics compared to articles published in similar but lower-ranked journals. They also find a similar result for single-authored articles compared to articles with multiple authors. Finally, Hilmer and Hilmer determine no significant returns result from being the lead author of an article in which the authors are listed nonalphabetically.
Conceptual framework
We conceptualize research productivity in a production economics framework where research output is denoted by J and reflects the number of publications in the WoS produced by a faculty member. We hypothesize, as is common in the production function literature, that output is a function of both labor (L) and capital (K). However, we appeal to the literature of Becker (1962) and Barro (2001) and cite others who distinguish between capital in the traditional sense and human capital (K H ) that laborers in the production process may possess. Therefore, labor reflects a quantity of effort, whereas human capital reflects the skills and knowledge brought to the research process. Given the university research context of this study we define institutional capital (K I ) as the unique resources the institution provides to the research process. Accordingly, we identify various subcategories for L, K H , and K I and write the production function in a general format as:
and we also define various subcategories within each input category.
Labor
As noted above, because we focus on faculty in colleges of agriculture at land-grant universities, annual appointments generally range between 9 and 12 months and consist of different combinations of teaching, research, and/or extension activities. Thus, we include a dummy variable for faculty who hold appointments of 9 months. We also suggest the quantity of labor available for research is affected by the time that a faculty member devotes to teaching and/or extension activities. In addition, we recognize this labor often includes graduate students and post-doctoral research associates and therefore we also include these two categories as a measure of the labor available for the research process.
Institutional capital
Institutional capital is the second input category available for the research process. We identify institutions by quality, assuming that stronger research institutions provide more research capital to the researcher. Thus, we include a variable that indicates if a faculty member works at an institution that is among the top ten in the United States in the particular discipline based on total number of publications in the WoS for the period we investigate. We also identify institutional capital according to the proportion of a faculty member's research that involves an interdisciplinary research center. We presume some universities provide additional resources to their faculty through such centers and that these resources typically exceed those provided in a departmental context. We also include university financial support and grant funds available from the institution in the research process. While we acknowledge that the past efforts of a faculty member generate many research dollars, in a particular production period only a fixed set of funds is available to a faculty member. Finally, we include a dummy variable for faculty members who hold endowed chairs or professorships at their respective institutions. While such distinctions are correctly viewed as recognition for past accomplishments, they can also act as motivators and an incentive that administrators can use to attract and retain productive faculty. Scientometrics (2013) 97:519-533 523 Human capital
The third category of inputs that we identify is the attributes of human capital brought to the research process by a particular faculty member. The first variable we use to measure human capital identifies if a faculty member received a PhD degree from a top ten institution in his or her discipline, again based on the total number of publications in the WoS for the period we investigate. Next, we include a dummy variable for faculty members who hold the title of ''fellow'' or a similar designation in a scientific association. While somewhat similar in nature to our dummy variable for faculty who hold endowed chairs, this fellows dummy variable is not specific to a particular institution; thus, we include it with our human capital inputs. We also use two dummy variables to characterize the number of years a faculty member has spent in the profession following the completion of a PhD degree. This variable captures experience and time allowed for research maturation; therefore, we hypothesize individual faculty members produce different quantities of research output according to their years of experience. We also include another category of human capital for faculty members who have taken a sabbatical and maintain this variable theoretically reflects an improvement in human capital as a sabbatical represents an opportunity for a faculty member to reinvigorate his or her research skills. Finally, we include a set of human capital variables that reflects a self-assessment of some intangible characteristics by the individual that we hypothesize affect the research output of the individual. These variables include if a faculty member believes he or she: (1) is an effective time manager; (2) is a good writer in terms of scientific writing; and (3) has a competitive personality, at least in the context of the research process. Thus, these variables reflect various intrinsic attributes of human capital a faculty member employs in the research process.
We acknowledge that the research outputs of various disciplines are not identical and the style of writing, style of publications, and length of articles vary across disciplines. Thus, we use agricultural economics as the default category and we include a dummy variable to reflect those researchers who work in the discipline of agronomy and a second dummy variable to reflect those who work in the area of food science.
Data
We began by constructing a database of tenured or tenure-track faculty employed at landgrant universities throughout the US based on the number of peer-reviewed journal articles and reviews listed for each individual in the WoS. Other publications (such as conference proceedings) were not included. We built the initial sample by obtaining the names of the 500 individuals with the most publications from 2000 to 2009 in each of the fields of agricultural economics, agronomy, and food science for a total initial sample of 1,500 faculty. Publications for faculty members in agricultural economics were obtained from the Social Science Citation Index while publications for faculty members in agronomy and food science were obtained from the Science Citation Index. A subset of peer-reviewed journals defined by the WoS constitutes the field of agricultural economics, and we obtained from the WoS the names of the 500 individuals who published the most articles across these agricultural economics journals from 2000 to 2009. For the fields of agronomy and food science, we defined a subset of peer-reviewed journals for each field and then obtained the names of the 500 individuals in each field who published the most articles across the journals of their respective field from 2000 to 2009. Thus, an individual was included in our initial sample if he or she was one of the top 500 authors across the subset of journals in his or her field. Conversely, an individual who published peer-reviewed articles in other journals within his or her field or in journals in other disciplines over the period we investigate-but who might reasonably consider himself or herself an agricultural economist, agronomist, or food scientist-was not captured in our sample set.
Individuals are listed in the WoS only by last name and initials; we next eliminated those individuals we could not identify from this information. The final database was generated by removing all individuals we determined are not presently tenured or tenuretrack faculty members at a US land-grant university. These include those individuals we determined have other employment (including those serving as full-time university administrators), are retired, deceased, or for whom we could not obtain a valid e-mail address. On April 15, 2010, an e-mail invitation to complete an online survey was sent to this final database consisting of 1,045 tenured or tenure-track faculty. A second reminder e-mail was sent on April 29, followed by a third reminder e-mail sent on May 13. A total of 378 usable responses were received by May 20, resulting in an overall response rate of *36 %.
3 The sample consisted of 162 tenure-track faculty in agricultural economics, 110 in agronomy, and 106 in food science. The response rates differed somewhat by field, with the highest rate in agricultural economics at 46 % while agronomy and food science recorded lower rates of *33 and 29 %, respectively. Table 1 above presents selected summary data from the survey. Several notes about this data are important, as we use each of these variables in our analysis in the following sections. First, the average number of publications from 2000 to 2009 listed in the table is not derived from a specific survey question but represents the information we obtained from the WoS database and used to build our sample set. Secondly, the appointment variables indicate, on average, a research appointment constitutes a majority of a faculty member's total appointment. This case is typical for faculty in colleges of agriculture, and because the sample we construct is based on an individual's total research publications, a relatively small average extension appointment is not surprising. However, we also note that all three appointment categories-research, teaching, and extension-each range from 3 A small number of individuals effectively removed themselves from our database because they informed us that they no longer met our selection criteria.
Scientometrics (2013) 97:519-533 525 0 to 100 %, indicating at least some faculty in our sample generate research publications regardless of their given appointments. Also, two variables reflect proportions of answers because of the nature of the survey questions. One of the questions is, ''Have you ever taken a sabbatical during your academic career?'' *40 % of respondents answered ''yes'' to this question, which is the value listed in Table 1 . Finally, the answers to two questions about funds are included in Table 1 . The first of these two questions is, ''What amount of annual funding support does your university provide to you for basic research needs? (please do not include your salary),'' and the value in Table 1 reflects the mean response to this question. The second of these two questions is, ''What is the approximate dollar amount of grants and contracts that you have brought into your university during the last 4 years? (please include only your share of any funding),'' and the mean value is included in Table 1 .
Methods and results
We performed a similar analysis of our data set for teaching appointments. Of the 378 faculty members we survey, 301 report a teaching appointment greater than 0 %. 4 These ''teaching faculty'' constitute almost 80 % of our sample set. Faculty in our sample set with no teaching appointment averaged 15.5 publications each in the WoS from 2000 to 2009, while faculty in our sample who hold a teaching appointment averaged 13.7 publications over the same period. A t test of this difference finds it lacks statistical significance (t stat = 1.49). We further analyze the sample comparing faculty members who have a teaching appointment of 25 % or less with those who have greater teaching appointments.
5
Teaching faculty who hold appointments of 25 % or less total 216 faculty members, or 57 % of the sample. These faculty members average 16.1 publications over the period we examine, while faculty members who hold teaching appointments greater than 25 % average 11.4 publications over the same period. A t test of this difference finds it is strongly statistically significant (t stat = -4.43). These findings for teaching appointments are summarized in Table 2 below. Thus, faculty members who hold teaching appointments of 25 % or less averaged almost 5 additional publications in the WoS over the period 2001-2009 compared to faculty members who hold larger teaching appointments. Depending on how appointments are defined by individual institutions, a 25 % teaching appointment normally represents 2-3 courses per academic year, or around 6-10 credit hours. These results indicate, economically speaking, that economies of scope may exist for teaching appointments of 25 % or less in terms of research output, but that diseconomies of scope for research set in once appointments exceed 25 %. Another way of stating this result is that the cost of teaching beyond the 25 % appointment level is a reduction in publications in the WoS. 6 With regards to the literature, our finding-at least for appointments greater than 25 %-supports the work of Fenker (1977) and Fairweather (1999) who find that teaching and research are more or less independent activities, as well as that of Porter and Toutkoushian (2006) , who find a negative relationship may exist between research and teaching. However, our conclusion contrasts with the recent work by Shin and Cummings (2010) , who find that the amount of time faculty members spend on teaching did not impact their research publications.
In particular, we focus on those faculty found in the top 25 % of those we survey in terms of the number of publications. With the work of Foltz and Barham (2009) in mind, we examine the appointments of the faculty in our sample. Of the 378 useable surveys we received, 261 faculty members report no extension appointment. Thus, about 31 % of the faculty we survey we consider ''extension faculty.'' Interestingly, the average number of publications per extension faculty member in the WoS for the period we survey is 14.4; for non-extension faculty over the same period the average number is 13.9. However, by conducting a t test on this sample, we find that this difference is not statistically significant (t stat = -0.41). Therefore, in contrast to Foltz and Barham, we find no difference between the research productivity of faculty members who hold extension appointments and those who do not. We also examine this productivity over a 10-year period while they use a 5-year period. However, given the way we construct our sample set-selecting from faculty with the largest number of publications-some selection bias may affect our finding. Following Foltz and Barham, we also examine faculty members who hold extension appointments of 40 % or less. These individuals constitute a large portion of the sample, 320 out of 378, or almost 85 %. We find from 2000 to 2009 these faculty members produced on average 14.5 publications found in the WoS each, compared to all other faculty who on average produced 11.78 publications each over the same period. A t test of this difference finds it statistically significant (t stat = 2.31). As with teaching appointments, we find that economies of scope in terms of research may exist for extension appointments of 40 % or less, and that diseconomies of scope set in for extension appointments exceeding 40 %. These economies of scope also likely occur at higher appointments for extension than teaching because research and extension activities (particularly in terms of generating publications) are more similar and therefore more complementary than research and teaching activities. Following the work of Foltz and Barham, this second finding is consistent with their results as we determine faculty who hold extension appointments greater than 40 % produce a significantly smaller number of publications in the WoS. Table 3 below summarizes these comparisons of research productivity among extension faculty.
Our final analysis of the research productivity of the faculty we survey involves developing a regression model with the number of publications in the WoS from 2000 to 2009 as the dependent variable. A Poisson regression model is used to account for the nonnegative integer-valued aspect of the outcomes. With this model the probability of an event count is determined by a Poisson distribution and the conditional mean of the Poisson distribution is a function of a vector of covariate explanatory variables. The independent variables follow from the preceding discussion of our conceptual model, and the regression model also includes dummy variables for the agronomy and food science disciplines in order to account for the relative differences in research output across the disciplines we examine (Table 4) . Table 4 presents the results of the model described above. The sample includes 309 observations, which reflect the number of responses to all of the survey questions from which we form our independent variables. Not surprisingly, the two variables that are most strongly statistically significant are the dummy variables for the agronomy and food science disciplines. These variables reflect relative differences in publication rates across discipline, as faculty in both food science and agronomy publish at significantly higher rates than faculty in agricultural economics. All of the variables we classify as labor inputs in the model are statistically significant. The variables that are most strongly significant are the variables for number of graduate students advised and the dummy variable for faculty who hold extension appointments greater than 40 %. The positive sign on the variable for number of students advised indicates an increase in the number of publications produced. Advising graduate students, up to a point, may lead to additional publications as each student who completes degree requirements generates a thesis or dissertation that in turn typically leads to one or more publications. The variable for faculty who hold extension appointments has a negative sign, indicating holding an appointment greater than 40 % reduces the number of WoS publications produced. Similarly, the next most strongly significant variable, the dummy variable for holding a teaching appointment greater than 25 %, also has a negative sign. The remaining two labor input variables are approximately equally statistically significant. However, the dummy variable for faculty who hold 9-month appointments or annual contracts has a positive sign while the variable for number of post-doctoral research associates supervised has a negative sign. While this finding appears rather counterintuitive, unlike advising most graduate students supervising a post-doctoral researcher does not guarantee that additional peer-reviewed journal articles (in the subsets of journals defined) will materialize. As post-doctoral researchers are hired to assist with a faculty member's current research, their length of employment is both temporary and indeterminate. Their employment may also directly relate to research grants with outputs that do not include the WoS publications defined by our study.
Of the six variables representing different forms of institutional capital included in the model, four are statistically significant. All of the institutional capital variables have a positive sign. The most strongly significant variable is for dollars in grants and university support. The other significant variables are the percentage of a faculty member's research that is multi-institutional, the dummy variable for faculty who are employed by a top ten institution (again, in terms of publication counts), and the dummy variable for faculty who hold an endowed chair. The variable for affiliation with a research center and the dummy variable for faculty who have taken a sabbatical are not significant.
The final category of inputs in our model, human capital, includes seven variables. Five of these variables are statistically significant. The dummy variable for self-assessment of time management is the most strongly significant of the human capital variables and has a positive sign, and is closely followed in significance by the dummy variable for selfassessment of competitive personality, which also has a positive sign. The next most strongly significant variable is the dummy variable for writing ability; however, this variable has a negative sign. This finding may also appear somewhat counter-intuitive, but in the case of publishing peer-reviewed articles, good writers may be recognized as such by their colleagues and/or co-authors. Therefore because of their skills, in economic terms, these individuals may possess a comparative advantage (perhaps at the request of their coauthors) in writing and revising manuscripts rather than engaging in actual research. The variable for faculty who are fellows in a scientific association is similar in statistical significance to the variable for writing ability and likewise has a positive sign. The other statistically significant human capital variable is the dummy variable for faculty members who received their PhD from a top ten institution, which also has a positive sign. Neither of the dummy variables for number of years since earning the PhD-10-15 years and more than 20 years, respectively-are statistically significant. These results suggest that there are 'intangibles' that are difficult to observe but that do influence research output.
Given our findings regarding research productivity, a question arises at to what an administrator can do to incentivize faculty or retain top faculty. In our final analysis, we investigate what incentives administrators could use to retain and motivate researchers (Table 5) . Following Fenker (1977) and Smart (1978) , we investigated a series of incentives that an institution might provide a faculty member. Specifically, we focused on differences in responses from the most productive researchers relative to others. The question read, ''Consider the following statements about incentives an institution may provide a researcher. Out of 100 total points, please allocate points to each statement according to how important you believe each factor is in terms of its effect on your research productivity.'' The series consists of six incentives, none of which on average received a majority of the total points allocated. In addition to recording these responses, we also analyze them by comparing the responses of the ''top'' faculty to those of all other researchers we survey by aggregating the top 25 % of respondents according to the number of articles they published over the 2000-2009 period. Clearly, both top performing research faculty and those in the lower tier allocate the most votes for merit-based salary raises from the options provided. Interestingly, there is no statistical difference in the response of two groups that presumably would not be treated similarly in a merit-based system.
From this analysis, we find statistical differences in the responses to three of the six incentives by those in the top 25 % of researchers compared to the other respondents. The first of these three incentives is, ''Additional research support and funding,'' which receives the second-largest allocation of points across all respondents. We find a statistically significant difference exists between the top 25 % of faculty members, who allocate on average 23.94 points, and the other 75 % of faculty members, who allocate on average 28.28 points to this incentive. This difference is statistically significant at the 5 % level. Thus, top faculty members appear less induced by institutionally-provided research resources than their peers. The second of these incentives is, ''Sincere notes and verbal 
Discussion
The preceding analyses of our survey lead to a number of implications about faculty researchers in colleges of agriculture. First, as demonstrated by the results of t tests and the regression model, teaching appointments and extension appointments can have considerable effects on the number of research publications a faculty member produces. However, while significant these effects may not be absolute for all levels of appointments. For example, merely holding an extension appointment does not necessarily mean a faculty member produces fewer research publications. But if this extension appointment exceeds 40 % of the total appointment, the number of research publications the faculty member authors may be comparatively less, a conclusion Foltz and Barham (2009) also reach. Similarly, in the case of teaching, holding a teaching appointment in and of itself does not result in fewer research publications for the faculty members in the agriculture-related disciplines we survey. However, faculty members whose teaching appointments exceed 25 % of their total appointment may produce a significantly smaller number of WoS publications. Finally, while sabbaticals are often viewed as an opportunity for a faculty member to exclusively devote time and energies to a specific research project or activity, we find no significant difference in the number of WoS publications produced by faculty who have participated in sabbaticals and those who have not.
Conclusions
Administrators in colleges of agriculture at land-grant universities face daunting tasks in meeting the missions of teaching, research, and extension through the faculty they oversee. The pressure to increase research productivity coexists with more competition for funds from external grants and contracts, as well as shrinking budgets for teaching and extension. The findings of our study can provide administrators with insights about what factors they can influence that affect the research output of their faculty. First, highly productive faculty in the fields of agricultural economics, agronomy, and food science can and do perform teaching and extension duties simultaneously. However, when upper limits on these latter activities are surpassed, research output can begin to decline. Specifically, for faculty members who hold teaching appointments greater than 25 %, the number of publications they author that appear in the WoS is significantly lower. A comparable finding occurs for faculty members who hold extension appointments greater than 40 %. Thus, administrators who are concerned with the research output of their faculty-as well as the faculty themselves-should carefully consider the allocation of academic appointments. Similarly, based on our findings administrators concerned with individual research output should weigh the lengths of annual contracts offered to their faculty members, such as 9-month contracts.
While we find a significant positive impact in terms of research productivity for grants and direct allocations of university funds to individual faculty members for research, the significance of this variable is similar to others in our model. Obviously funding can be important to a faculty member's research; however, we think the findings of our study suggest administrators should recognize external grants and contracts and other funds represent only one input in the production of research.
Our results also indicate administrators concerned about research productivity should carefully evaluate the nature of requests by their faculty members for sabbaticals. In terms of WoS publications, we find no significant difference between faculty who have taken a sabbatical and those who have not. Finally, our analysis of research collaborations between faculty members and their colleagues at other institutions finds a significantly positive effect on publications. Given its similarity to other variables in our model and the work of Lee and Bozeman (2005) , we also conclude further analysis of such collaborations is needed.
